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ACCRETION-RESTORATION BY RIVER OF LAND PREVIOUSLY WASHED AWAY.-The
plaintiff owned land in section 3i, adjoining land in section 30 owned by the
defendant. The Missouri river, which bounded the plaintiff's land on the other
side, gradually washed it away until it became totally submerged, so that the
defendant became the riparian owner. Thereupon the land submerged was
restored by gradual deposit. Held, that the land in question was the property
of the plaintiff. Allard v. Curran (i918, So. Dak.) E68 N. W. 761.
The result seems sound. However, the point decided is one upon which
there is a conflict of authority. In accord with the principal case are: Gilbert
v. Eldridge (i8gi) 47 Minn. 21o; Ocean City Association v. Shriver (igoo,
Ct. Er.) 64 N. 3. L. 55o, 46 Atl. 69o. In Kansas and Missouri the contrary
result was reached in cases which also involved the Missouri river. Peuker v.
Canter (I9OI) 62 Kan. 363, 63 Pac. 617; Widdecombe v. Chiles (i9o2) 173 Mo.
195, 73 S. W. 444. The Kansas and Missouri courts followed an earlier Con-
necticut case. Welles v. Bailey (1887) 55 Conn. 292, io Atl. 565. There the
court seemed to reach its result partly because of the difficulty of determining
the boundary-a difficulty not present where, as in the principal case, the
section line is the boundary.
BILs AND NoT-s-RAISING OF CHECK FAcILITATED BY SPACES LEFT IN DRAw-
ING-LABTiLTY OF BANK TO DRAwmR-The plaintiff signed a check handed to
him by his clerk, who kept the petty cash, and who stated that two.pounds
were wanted for petty cash. The body of the check was in the handwriting
of the clerk. The line intended for-inserting words was blank; on the line
intended for figures were the figures " 2 o.o.," but with spaces before and after
the "2" large enough for the insertion of additional figures. After obtaining
the plaintiff's signature, the clerk wrote into the blank line the words "one
hundred and twenty pounds" and added the figures "i" and "o" on either
side of the "2." He then cashed the check and absconded. Held, that the drawer
could not recover from the bank the amount paid less the original amount of
the check. London Joint Stock Bank, Limited v. Macmillan (1g18, H. L.) I9
L. T. Rep. 387.
The Lords base their decision on the special relation between banker and
depositor, which requires immediate honor by the bank of every genuine check
regular on its face and covered by funds on deposit. The Lords find a cor-
responding duty of the depositor-though one limited to the actual transaction
of drawing-to draw his checks with sufficient care not to invite fraudulent
alteration. Such fraudulent alteration is regarded as a direct consequence of
breach of that duty; and the banker who is thereby misled into paying 'over
money has his remedy against the negligent depositor-though circumstances in
which such remedy would be availed of are difficult to imagine-and if his
remedy, then his defence by way of setoff in a suit like the present. This is
the doctrine of Young v. Grote (1827, Eng. C. P.) 4 Bing. 253. A subsidiary
ground of the decision was an estoppel of the drawer, in view of his duty
toward the bank, to deny that the clerk to whom the check was delivered in its
incomplete form had authority to fill it out in the way he did. This is the
explanation of Young v. Grote given in one important line of subsequent dicta,
reviewed by the Lord Chancellor. The opinions of the Lords are gratifying
in the openness with which they face and satisfy actual business conditions.
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For discussion of the whole problem involved, suggesting a broader ground
of decision, see CO mENTs (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 242, 269, criticizing
Macmillan v. London Joint Stock Bank, Limited [1917] 2 K. B. 439, the decision
of the Court of Appeal which the principal case now reverses.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PASSING AcT OVER VETO-NUMBER OF VOTES REQUIRED.-
In a criminal prosecution for violating a state statute whose validity depended
upon the Webb-Kenyon Act (37 U. S. St at L. 699), the validity of this Act
was attacked upon the ground that it had not been constitutionally passed. It
was passed over the President's veto but received in the senate only a two-
thirds vote of the Senators present (a quorum) which was less than two-thirds
of all the members entitled to sit in the Senate. Held, that the Act was legally
passed. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas (Jin. 7, i919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct.
Term, No. 14.
This decision is of special interest at the present time because of the similarity
between the Constitutional provision relative to passing a bill over the Presi-
dent's veto (sec. 7, Art I) and the provisions empowering "two-thirds of both
houses" to propose Constitutional amendments (Art. V). The opinion adverts
to this similarity and relies upon Congressional precedent in the passage of
Constitutional amendments and upon decisions with respect to the amendment
of state constitutions. It is clear, therefore, that opponents of the Prohibition
Amendment will have to abandon the argument that that Amendment was not
validly proposed because adopted by less than two-thirds of the entire member-
ship of the House and the Senate.
CONTEMPT OF COURT-CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPTS-USING POLITICAL PRESSURE
To INDUCE DEFENDA-T'S ArToRmuy TO WITHDRAw -While a divorce suit was
pending, the complainant's father threatened the defendant's attorney, who
was a candidate for reappointment as city solicitor, with political pressure
unless he would cease opposition to the divorce or would withdraw from the
case. Contempt proceedings were instituted at the request of the court.
Held, that the respondent was guilty of contempt In re Bowers (1918, N. J.
Ch.) 1O4 Atl. 196.
The court reasons that the defendant's conduct was an attempt to deprive the
court of the services of an officer of the court. Although a novel instance of a
constructive contempt, the decision appears clearly sound.
CONTRAcTS-IMPOSSIBILITY CAUSED By AcT OF STATE-FAILURE TO PRODUCE A
PRINCIPAL IN CoURT.-One G, having been convicted of a misdemeanor, gave
an appeal bond conditioned to appear and submit to judgment in case of
affirmance. After such an affirmance he failed to appear because in the mean-
time he had been convicted of murder and imprisoned for a term of 40 years.
Held, that the bondsmen were excused, since the purpose of the bond was not
to secure payment of the fine but to secure the appearance of the principal,
and the bondsmen's fulfilment of the condition was rendered impossible by an
act of the state itself. State v. Herber (1918, Okla.) 173 Pac. 651.
For a discussion of an allied problem see COMMENTS, p. 399, 401, n. II.
CONTaACTS-REScISSION-MISREPRESENTATION OF BUYER'S IDENTITY.-Through
telegraphic correspondence an individual, purporting to represent a corporation
which was actually fictitious, bought a large quantity of linseed oil for future
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delivery. The seller's diligent inquiries led to the belief that the buyer was a
corporation with resources. On discovering that the buyer was really an indi-
vidual with no financial backing, the seller gave notice that the sale was
cancelled. The buyer, refusing to accede, sued for damages. An action was
brought in equity by the seller to enjoin the prosecution of the action at law.
Held, that the seller was entitled to an injunction, as the concealment of a
material fact which, if known to the vendor, would have kept him from entering
into the contract, was such fraud as entitled to rescission. Fay v. Hill (C. C. A.
8th) 249 Fed. 415.
In its determination of the parties' rights the case is amply supported by the
authorities. Fifer v. Clearfield, etc. (igo6) lO3 Md. i, 62 Atl. 122 ; Boulton
v. Jones (857, Ex.) 2 H. & N. 564. But the form of relief given, granting an
injunction against the prosecution of an action at law although the defence
at law is complete, is most unusual, and contrary to the general equity rule.
2 Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies (3d ed., i9o5) sec. 638. For thorough analysis
of the relitions of the parties to executory contracts subject, like that in the
present case, to rescission, see COMMENTS (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 178, i81.
CoNTRAcTs-THiRD PARTY BENEFICIARY-STREET RAILwAY SUED ON CONTRACT
WITH CITY TO KEEP STREEr RFPAIRED.-The defendant, a street railway company,
in consideration of the license to build its road in the street, contracted with
the city to keep the street in repair. Plaintiff was injured because of the
failure of the company to keep the street in repair. Held, that the plaintiff
could recover directly from the street railway company. Fowler v. Chicago
Railways Co. (i918, Ill.) 12o N. E. 635.
While the precise question involved hal never previously been presented
for decision in Illinois, cases in other jurisdictions had already reached the
same result. McMahon v. Second Avenue R. Co. (1878) 75 N. Y. 231; Jenree
v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. (1912) 86 Kan. 479, 121 Pac. 510. See also 39
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1112; Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 214. The courts place the result
on the ground of avoiding circuity of action. Cf. the analogous cases where
a landlord has agreed with his tenant to repair the premises. Payne v. Rogers
(794) 2 H. Bl. 350; Girdley v. City of Bloomington (1873) 68 Ill. 47.
EXEMPTIONS-WHO ARE "DEBTORS"--JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY AS DERT The
plaintiff obtained a di-,orce from the defendant and a judgment for alimony
payable in installments at stated periods during ler life or until re-marriage.
Subsequently the defendant married a second wife. Certain installments of
the alimony being due and unpaid, the plaintiff caused an execution to issue
on the judgment for alimony and under this the defendant's employer was
garnished. The defendant contended that under a statute exempting the wages
of a debtor who was head of a family his wages were exempt. Held, that the
defendant's wages were exempt from the claim of the first wife for alimony.
Salinger, Stevens and Ladd, JJ., dissenting. Schooley v. Schooley (1918, Iowa)
169 N. W. 56.
The question is purely one of the fair construction of an ambiguous statute
which gives exemption to "debtors." Does it include all "debtors"? The
majority give the word a literal interpretation. Salinger, J., in a somewhat
lengthy dissenting opinion argues forcibly that it does not. It may be ques-
tioned whether a husband who has given his first wife ground for divorce ought
to be permitted to escape from making further payments out of his earnings
for the support of the former wife by acquiring a second wife. If we believe
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he ought not so to escape, we shall agree with the minority in resolving the
doubt in favor of the first wife. No other cases raising the precise point of
construction have been found.
INJUNcTIONs-BREAcHi OF NEGATIVE COVENANT-UNIQUE PERSONAL SERVICE BY
WAR CORRESPONDENT.-The defendant, Frank H. Simonds, contracted to serve
the complainant as an editorial writer for the New York Tribune for four
years and not to write for any other publication during that term. Before the
expiration of the agreed time, he resigned his editorial position and began to
write war articles for competing newspapers. The complainant sought an
injunction. Held, that the complainant was entitled to enjoin the defendant
from writing for any publication other than the New York Tribune, because of
the unique value of the defendant's services. Tribune Association v. Simonds
(I918, N. J. Ch.) IO4 Atl. 386.
This is an interesting application of the familiar doctrine of Lumley v.
Wagner (1852) i De G. M. & M. 6o4-a doctrine that has been greatly criticized,
perhaps deservedly so, but one which has been generally followed in this
country.
MARINE INSURANCE-INSURER'S CONDITIONAL PAYMENT NO BAR TO SUIT
AGAINST CARRIER IN INSURER'S INTEREST.-A cargo of sugar shipped on a certain
vessel was severely damaged because of the unseaworthiness of the vessel's
hull. The carrier's liability was limited by the bill of lading to negligent loss.
The shipper insured the cargo under a policy which limited recovery to
losses for which the carrier was not legally responsible. The insurance com-
pany after the loss advanced to the shipper "as a loan" an amount equal to
the loss, taking a receipt in which the shipper agreed that the "loan" was
"repayable only to the extent of any net recovery" from the carrier and that
he would sue the carrier for the benefit of and at the expense of the insurance
company. A libel against the carrier was filed in the name of the shipper but
actually for the sole benefit of the insurance company, through their proctors
and counsel, and wholly at their expense. The carrier contended that as the
shipper had already been compensated for his loss the libel should be dismissed.
Held, that the insurers were entitled to recover. Edgar F. Luckenbach et al.
v. W. J. McCahan Sugar, etc. Co. (1918) 39 Sup. Ct. 53.
Apparently the question involved has never before been presented to the
Supreme Court. The decision gives effect to the agreement of the parties.
While, as the opinion says, "it is creditable to the ingenuity of business men
that an arrangement should be devised which is consonant both with the
needs of commerce and the demands of justice," it would seem that, under
the modern rule that actions against a carrier for negligent loss of property
are assignable, the result could be reached by an agreement saying in simple
English that the insured assigned the claim to the insurer and that-so far as
the latter recovered from the carrier the loan should be discharged.
MINMUiai WAGE CoitmISSIoN-NON-COMPULSORY MINIMUM WAGE-COM-
PULSORY GIVING OF EVIDENCE AS TO COMPLIANCE.-A statute of Massachusetts
provided for the establishment of a non-compulsory rate that ought to be
paid to female workers in the various employments. To ascertain what
employers were, of their own volition, following the recommendation of the
board, the statute further provided that the commission could resort to the
courts to compel the employers to give evidence as to the wages actually paid
418 YALE LAW JOURNAL
by them. After such an investigation, the commission was authorized to "enter
a decree of its findings and note thereon the names of the employers
who fail or refuse to accept such minimum wage and to agree to abide by it."
A summary of the findings and the action of the employers was to be made
public. A minimum wage was established for women employed in laundries,
and respondents, who conducted laundries, were summoned to give evidence
before the commission as to wages paid by them. They refused, and a petition
was brought to compel them to testify. They resisted on the grounds that
the portion of the statute which required them to give this evidence violated
the fourteenth amendment by impairing freedom of contract; also that it
compelled self-crimination. Held, that the statute was valid. Holcombe v.
Creamer (i918, Mass.) i2o N. E. 354.
In holding the statute constitutional, the court points out that it does not
establish a compulsory minimum wage, but leaves all concerned free to con-
tract as they desire. The policy and aim of the statute is to enforce a minimum
wage, not by direct legislative and judicial action but by the pressure of public
opinion. The compulsory disclosure of rates furnishes the means by which the
public can be accurately- informed as to those employers who are not paying a
fair wage. It is obvious how such publicity may bring about the result which
the statute seeks to obtain. The statute therefore presents a simple and con-
stitutional method of obtaining in large measure the benefits of a compulsory
minimum wage law without raising the difficult questions of constitutionality
which an attempt to introduce compulsion would involve.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONTRACT NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN A YEAR.-On
Monday the plaintiff was employed by the defendant for a week's trial, and
on the following Saturday morning an oral agreement was made for a year's
service, the defendant saying: "You will have the whole year a job with me;
you go ahead." The court construed this to mean that work under the new
contract was to begin on the following Monday morning and not eo instanti
on Saturday. Held, that the contract was not within the statute of frauds and
was enforceable. Friedman v. Amster (i918, Sup. Ct App. T.) 6o N. Y. L. J.
1229.
This is contrary to several previous decisions on the point in New York,
but it has never been passed upon by the Court of Appeals. It is in harmony
with decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama and the Court of Appeal
in England. Dickson v. Frisbee (x876) 52 Ala. 165; Smith v. Gold Coast Co.
[I9o3] I K. B. 285. A careful review of all previous decisions on the point is
made by Mr. Justice Bijur. The consistent tendency of all courts to take
out of the statute as many cases as possible is no doubt beneficial, on the
assumption that under prevailing conditions our courts can arrive at the truth
in the absence of documentary evidence. The statute remains useful, however,
being held in terrorem and causing most agreements of importance to be
reduced to -vriting.
